L E T T E R S TO T H E E D I T O R HlNl Influenza: Contact Investigation Burden because of Failure to Institute Influenza Precautions in Patients with Negative Rapid Influenza Diagnostic Test Results
Winthrop-University Hospital is a university-affiliated, 600-bed tertiary care teaching hospital in the New York epicenter of the HlNl influenza pandemic. From April through June 2009, Winthrop-University Hospital and emergency departments (EDs) at other area hospitals were inundated with patients with influenza-like illness who visited the hospital for HlNl influenza screening.
1 The ED at Winthrop-University Hospital uses the rapid influenza A test (QuickVue A/ B) to screen ambulatory and admitted patients with influenza-like illness. The vast numbers of patients presenting to the ED for HlNl influenza testing severely taxed the testing capability. In patients admitted to the ED with probable HlNl influenza, implementation of influenza precautions was based on the rapid influenza A test results. Unfortunately, the rapid influenza A test is associated with 30% false-negative results. As predicted, many patients admitted to Winthrop-University Hospital with presumptive HlNl influenza were not placed on appropriate precautions in the ED. Because of 30% falsenegative results with the rapid influenza A test, oropharyngeal specimens were obtained for respiratory fluorescent antibody viral testing. The respiratory fluorescent antibody viral panel detects influenza A and B viruses, metapneumoviruses, respiratory syncytial virus, parainfluenza viruses, and adenoviruses. Specimens were obtained from admitted patients with presumed HlNl influenza for rapid influenza A testing, respiratory fluorescent antibody viral panel testing, and reversetranscription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) for detection of HlNl influenza; rapid influenza A and respiratory fluorescent antibody viral test results were discordant. 2 ' 3 The definitive laboratory diagnosis of HlNl influenza was not often possible, because the health department was inundated with huge numbers of requests and refused most specimens for RT-PCR testing; in addition, when the test was performed, results were not reported until much later.
Winthrop-University Hospital and other hospitals had difficulties deciding which patients with influenza-like illness had probable HlNl influenza (ie, which patients should be placed on influenza precautions and receive treatment with oseltamivir). Patients admitted to the hospital who had positive rapid influenza A test results in the ED were immediately placed on appropriate influenza precautions and given oseltamivir. Patients admitted to the hospital who had negative rapid influenza A test results posed a major infection control problem. Respiratory fluorescent antibody viral panel results were not rapidly available, which limited the usefulness of the test in determining which patients were unlikely to have HlNl influenza and could have influenza precautions discontinued. Because specimens for RT-PCR for a definitive diagnosis of HlNl influenza were refused or results were not rapidly reported, determination of which patients should be placed on influenza precautions, as well as contact investigations, were needlessly complicated. Definitive results of HlNl influenza RT-PCR were usually reported after the results were clinically or epidemiologically relevant.
Because of the diagnostic dilemmas and discordant laboratory results of influenza A tests (ie, rapid influenza A or respiratory fluorescent antibody viral panel tests), we applied clinical criteria to admitted adult patients with negative influenza A test results. 4 ' 5 Unfortunately, patients admitted to the hospital with probable HlNl influenza were not often placed on influenza precautions or treated with oseltamivir, because results of their rapid tests for influenza A were negative.
The patients with negative results of the rapid influenza A test who had probable HlNl influenza placed an enormous burden on the Infection Control Section and the Employee Health Service. For patients admitted to the hospital with presumed HlNl influenza, infection control workers had to perform contact investigations of exposed patients and the Employee Health Service had to performed contact investigations of healthcare workers.
Problems with initiation of influenza precautions on the basis of negative rapid influenza A test results were overwhelming from April through May. Starting in June 2009, the Infectious Diseases Division used clinical and laboratory criteria to presumptively diagnosis probable HlNl influenza and to place patients on appropriate influenza precautions. The most useful clinical marker in patients with influenzalike illness and presumed HlNl influenza was otherwise unexplained relative lymphopenia. Relative lymphopenia (ie, less than 21% lymphocytes) was present in all adult patients with a clinical presentation suggestive of HlNl influenza (ie, myalgias and/or shortness of breath). In patients who had relative lymphopenia due to other causes, an elevated creatine phosphokinase level, thrombocytopenia, or mildly increased serum transaminase levels were other markers of HlNl influenza.
2,3 ' 6 " 8 The Infectious Diseases Division and Infection Control Section reviewed the records of every patient admitted to the ED with presumed HlNl influenza to determine whether precautions and/or oseltamivir treatment should be continued or discontinued.
Employee Health Service resources were taxed to the limit because of extensive contact investigations of healthcare workers in contact with patients with potential HlNl influenza to determine which healthcare workers should be fur- loughed and which should be allowed to work while receiving oseltamivir prophylaxis. From April through June, 14 patients and healthcare workers had presumed HlNl influenza, requiring 298 contact investigations. The Employee Health Service determined that 117 potential exposures were related to the index cases. The time from hospital admission to placement of patients on precautions for presumed HlNl influenza who had negative rapid influenza A test results varied from 1 to 4 days. Of the healthcare workers with potential HlNl influenza, 102 were considered to be close contacts and 90 were offered oseltamivir prophylaxis and/or were furloughed. (Table) By June, the number of patients with presumed HlNl influenza who had not been placed on appropriate precautions after hospital admission decreased because of several factors. One factor was the recognition that negative screening test results (ie, rapid influenza A and/or respiratory fluorescent antibody viral panel tests) did not rule out HlNl influenza. Second, clinical criteria of the Infection Diseases Division was used for diagnosis of presumptive HlNl influenza (ie, otherwise unexplained relative lymphopenia, elevated creatine phosphokinase level, thrombocytopenia, and elevated serum transaminase levels, combined with a history of signs and symptoms, including fever and/or chills, dry cough, shortness of breath, and myalgias) and for identifying cases and placing patients on influenza precautions. Third, the decision to institute influenza precautions and/or oseltamivir treatment was determined by the Infection Control Section and Infectious Diseases Department and was no longer based on negative rapid influenza A test results. Although this approach was not perfect, it greatly decreased the burden of contact investigations of exposed healthcare workers and patients. Key clinical and laboratory tests that proved to be useful in identifying patients with probable HlNl influenza were also useful in identifying patients with influenza-like illness who had a low probability of having HlNl influenza and did not require influenza precautions. 
Legionnaires Disease-Reordered
To the Editor-Legionnaires disease can be classified into 3 exposure categories depending on the assumed environment of the exposure that led to infection: community-acquired Legionnaires disease, travel-associated Legionnaires disease, and nosocomially acquired Legionnaires disease. The disease frequency of Legionnaires disease by category is commonly presented as a proportion of cases of Legionnaires disease classified according to type of exposure among all cases for which exposure category is reported. In European countries, most cases of Legionnaires disease during the period from 2004 through 2006 were community acquired (66%); fewer were travel associated (27%) or nosocomially acquired (7%).'' 2 However, this representation does not take into account the number of person-days at risk within the exposure types. The number of cases divided by the number of persondays at risk is the incidence and should give another perspective on the likelihood of individuals to acquire Legionnaires disease when exposed within these categories.
We examined German data on cases of Legionnaires disease that were reported to the Robert Koch-Institute during the period from 2004 through 2006. These were classified in the following 4 categories: community-acquired Legionnaires disease, travel-associated Legionnaires disease, nosocomially acquired Legionnaires disease, and Legionnaires disease acquired in a nursing home. We obtained data on person-days at risk from the Federal Statistical Office, Wiesbaden, Germany.
"
5 To determine the number of days that the population was hospitalized or spent in nursing homes, we used occupancy data (Table 1) . Travel data were received in the form of number of nights that adults spent away from home for private or occupational purposes. 6 Private travel days were extrapolated to the entire population according to the proportion of adults in the total population (travel days among adults divided by the proportion of adults among the total population) ( Table 1) . To obtain the number of days spent in the community, we subtracted the sum of the number of travel days, the number of days hospitalized, and the number of days spent in nursing homes from the total ' Travel days is the sum of days spent on occupational travel (296,000,000) and nights spent on private travel by the general population (4,164,527,000 [N"]). N 0 was calculated from the no. of nights spent on private travel in the population >14 years old (N >14year! = 3,569,000,000) and the proportion of the population <15 years old (14.3%) by means of the formula N 0 = N >14yearj /(1 -0.143).
' To obtain the no. of days spent in the community, we subtracted the sum of the no. of travel days, the no. of days hospitalized, and the no. of days spent in nursing homes from the total no. of days lived by the German population (mean of total German population during 2004-2006 x 3 years x 365.25 days per year).
